

Macroprudential policies in financial markets



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What are Macroprudential Policies?



- **The objectives**
 - Managing the economic cycle (as traditional macro policies)
 - Controlling “systemic risk” and “financial instability”
- **The instruments**
 - Capital buffers
 - Leverage ratios, and the alike
 - ...
- **The spill-overs and externalities**
 - Across agents and institutions
 - Across countries (ADEMU)
 - Across time
- **The constraints**
 - Time inconsistency
 - Political economy

Macprudential Policies in Theory



- **Starting point: Modigliani-Miller**
- **Financial frictions matter because**
 - Prevent the efficient allocation of capital
 - Lead to boom/bust cycles
 - Quantitative and welfare implications from the transmission of shocks
 - Generate distributive issues and make agent's heterogeneity relevant
- **The many faces of financial frictions**
 - Imperfect information
 - Moral hazard
 - Collateral constraints
 - Limited liability
 - ..and Regulatory Arbitrage
- **Transmission mechanisms of shocks under financial frictions**
 - Who bears the risk
 - Interactions with other distortions (in product, labour markets)

Macroprudential Policies in Theory (II)



- **The research**
 - DSGE models with one friction/one instrument at a time
 - Ad hoc modelling (default, etc.)
 - Computation/estimation techniques with some limitations
- **Transmission mechanisms of shocks under financial frictions**
 - Who bears the risk
 - Interactions with other distortions (in product, labour markets)
 - The importance of agents' heterogeneity (wealth distribution, etc.)

Exploring unknown territories without cartography

Macroprudential Policies in Practice (I)



- **The operational framework**
 - Who is in charge?
 - Interactions with monetary and other policies
 - Interactions among instruments: Which ones and when
 - Crisis prevention versus crisis resolution (ADEMU)

- **The “state of the art”**
 - A list of elements and generic concepts
 - Not everything is neither fully understood nor precisely measured
 - A regulatory framework extremely complex in micro-supervision and poorly/incompletely designed as far as macroprudential policies are concerned

Macprudential Policies: Lessons from ADEMU



- **Contagion across countries**
 - Transmission mechanisms (Fornaro and Romei, 2018, Molteni 2018)
 - Limits to banks' holdings of sovereign debt
- **Financial imbalances and crisis**
 - Leverage bounds (Boháček)
 - The importance of aggregate shocks and non-linearities (Fernández-Villaverde, Hurtado and Nuño, 2018)
- **Institutional mechanisms to controlling financial imbalances**
 - Perennial question about monetary and macropru policies.
 - National and supranational institutions to make macropru policies operative

Final comment



- Leo Tolstoi: “*All happy families are alike, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way*”.
- Each financial instability episode, boom/bust cycle have different trade-offs between ex-ante efficiency and ex-post welfare costs.
- The future of macroprudential policies without cartography and without a fully operational framework.