The practical hurdles associated with implementing institutional reforms for better EU fiscal policy management, with particular focus on legal and political constraints, were studied by researchers involved in Work Package 4 (both economists and legal scholars).
Below you can find a list of working papers published in the ADEMU Working Paper Series, which have been relevant for the achievement of the objectives of Work Package 4.
| Title |
Author(s) |
Working Paper Number |
| The new Economic component of EMU: A Lawful and Effective Design? |
C. Kilpatrick |
WP 2016/007 |
| The Single Supervisory Mechanism: legal fragilities and possible solutions |
C.A. Petit, G.Monti |
WP2016/0016 |
| Voter Participation with Collusive Parties |
D.K.Levine, A.Mattozzi |
WP2016/0021 |
| Size, fungibility and the Strength of Lobbying Organizations |
D.K.Levine, S.Modica |
WP2016/0022 |
| Collusion constrained equilibrium |
R.Dutta, D.K.Levine, S.Modica |
WP2016/0023 |
| On the limits of EU economic policy coordination |
P.Leino, T.Saarenheimo |
WP2016/0036 |
| An Overview of Legal Aspects of Risk-Sharing |
P.Leino-Sandberg |
WP2016/0037 |
| Bank Resolution credibility and economic implications |
M.Yiatrou |
WP2016/0038 |
| EMU and national constitutional conditions to long-term change |
T.Beukers, C.Fasone |
WP2016/0039 |
| Euro CAC and the existing rules on sovereign debt restructuring in the euro area an appraisal 4 years after the Greek debt swap |
T. Martinelli |
WP2016/0043 |
| Structural Reforms in EU Member States: Exploring Sanction-based and Reward-based Mechanisms |
A. Steinbach |
WP2016/0045 |
| Competences and alignment in an emerging future |
R. Smits |
WP2017/77 |
| The Independence of the ECB: Justification, Limitations and possible Threats |
A. Thiele |
WP2017/79 |
| Calibrating central banks’ mandate: Central banking objectives, tasks, and measures within unitary and federal constitutional settings |
C. A. Petit |
WP2017/80 |
| Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue in the Euro Area? A Study of the Interaction between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism |
F. Amtenbrink and M. Markakis |
WP2017/81 |
| A European Finance Minister: Form follows function, but is it legal? |
M. Patrin |
WP2018/96 |
| All’s well that ends well? Crisis policy after the German Constitutional Court’s ruling in Gauweiler |
A. Steinbach |
WP2018/102 |
| The Commission’s 2017 Reflection Paper on the Deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union: a few critical observations |
L. Radic |
WP2018/104 |
| Controlling the Powers of the ECB: delegation, discretion, reasoning and care – what Gauweiler and Weiss and others can teach us |
H. C.H. Hofmann |
WP2018/107 |
| The ‘Haircut’ of Public Creditors under EU Law |
A. Steinbach |
WP2018/108 |
| Insurance-type Cooperation Mechanisms under EU law |
A. Steinbach |
WP2018/109 |
| Is a separate Eurozone budget a good idea? |
R. Crowe |
WP2018/120 |
Controlling the Powers of the ECB:
delegation, discretion, reasoning and care |
H. C.H. Hofmann |
WP2018/131 |
| Fiscal rules and structural reforms |
R. Sajedi, A. Steinbach |
WP2018/133 |
| A Parliamentary assembly for the Eurozone? |
D. Fromage |
WP2018/134 |
