Even 10 years after the start of the global financial crisis, and seven years after the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis, large stocks of government debt remain a significant concern in advanced as well as developing countries.

A major objective of the ADEMU project is to contribute to the scientific discussion on the future design of European institutions to deal with financial stability and debt sustainability. On 5-6 April, ADEMU held a two-day conference at the Toulouse School of Economics, featuring topics including optimal austerity (Timothy Kehoe, University of Minnesota), the cost of sovereign defaults (Aitor Erce, European Stability Mechanism) and optimal debt maturity management (Galo Nuno, Banco de Espana).

You can see the full programme for the conference here, with presentations listed below.

Hanging off a cliff: fiscal consolidations and default risk

Fiscal rules and the sovereign default premium

Limited participation and local currency sovereign debt

Optimal debt maturity management

Sovereign default in a monetary union

Pre-emptive sovereign debt restructuring and holdout litigation

Debt, defaults and dogma

Sovereign risk and fiscal information: a look at the US state of default in the 1840s

Debt seniority and self-fulfilling debt crises

Sovereign default and information frictions

Costs of sovereign default: restructuring strategies, bank distress and the credit-investment channel

Breaking the feedback loop: macroprudential regulation of banks’ sovereign exposures